REVISTA ESMAT
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RULE OF LAW, THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND ITS CONTROLS

ESTADO DE DIREITO, EXERCÍCIO DA GESTÃO PÚBLICA E OS SEUS CONTROLOS

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RESUMO

A partir de uma análise da fragilidade de controlos que estiveram na origem das crises económicas e sociais após 2008 e das suas consequências para os cidadãos, efetua-se uma abordagem sobre a relevância dos plúrimos controlos que devem convocar a gestão pública, no âmbito do Estado de Direito. Aos vários poderes de controlo é exigido um papel essencial, ainda que executados em perspectivas e níveis diferen-tes e por atores diferenciados. Desenvolvem-se os mecanismos de controlo social, constitucional, administrativo, financeiro e criminal, enquadrados numa dimensão transnacional, pública e privada, que leve em conta as exigências de transparência devida aos cidadãos.

Palavras-Chave: Estado de Direito; Gestão pública; Controles.

ABSTRACT

From an analysis of the fragility of controls that led to the economic and social crises after 2008 and their consequences for citizens, an approach is taken over the rele-vance of the multitude of controls that should be called upon by public administra-tion within the Rule of Law. The various powers of control are required to play an essential role, even if performed at different perspectives and levels and by different actors. Social, constitutional, administrative, financial and criminal control mechanisms are developed, framed in a public and private transnational dimension, taking into account the demands of transparency due to citizens.

KEYWORDS: Rule of Law; Public management; Controls.

THE SERPENT'S EGG

[1] O presente artigo tem por base uma intervenção pública efetuada no II Congresso Internacional de Desempenho do Setor Público (CIDESP), ocorrido em Florianópolis, Brasil, em agosto de 2018.

The rule of law is the practical expression of the model of political governance where the rule of laws is exercised by establishing legal limits that cannot be exceeded.

A question, historically discussed, is what kind of laws or law frames the actions of a government or administration, how broad they are, and what their limits are.

But also, what are the limits of those who ensure that they are complied with and, ultimately, what is the role of justice and jurisdiction in this debate.

This is a theoretical discussion that went on throughout the 20th century, particularly after Hitler's rise to power, through the ballot box and, above all, through the tragic annihilation of the laws legitimized by this "popular will", without any power, including the judicial power, opposing it.

Other, less tragic examples could be cited, both in Europe and in other parts of the world where the concept of law (and strict compliance with it) has served governments, often supported by the courts, to reduce the fundamental rights of citizens to mere goals for long-term fulfillment. The various, and ideologically diverse, dictatorships demonstrate the relevance of the problem. Justice has always, in these situations, been reduced to a caricature of justice.

History shows us that it is in the difficult or extreme moments of the political exercise that the legal-constitutional architecture that defines the powers, their degree of autonomy, and the mutual controls is tested in its theoretical validity.

And what are difficult or extreme moments? They are, to simplify, all those in which the consensus that legitimizes decisions does not exist or is very fragile.

"Constitutional" breaks, some political regime transitions or social crises are examples of this weakening.

The latter, already in this century, have assumed an extraordinary impressiveness, namely because of the public uneasiness they bring and, above all, because of the social fractures that are immanent to them.

Since the late 90s of the last century, it has been noticeable how the "snake's egg", the "capture" of the States and the institutions that make up the Rule of Law by a trail of diverse pathologies has been growing.

The takeover of the political system by the financial world, the apology of self-regulation of financial institutions without public controls[2], the circulation of capital and financial instruments without questioning their origins and destinations, the complicity between those who performed public and private functions, the blurring of the rules that prevent conflicts of interest, and, above all, the expansion of corruption through various areas of society are examples of such pathologies.

The economy has become the essential reason for public and private discourse, public governance[3] and, consequently, the very daily life of citizens.

The markets and their representatives, acting as the "main" economic actors, have become a kind of dogma, with some dimension of "untouchable" characters.

One could say, as some authors have said, that the economy has been elevated to the "status of a "value", equivalent to and, in some cases, replacing institutional values[4] such as virtue, responsibility, or even loyalty.

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[2] Sobre as responsabilidades das entidades financeiras que levaram à crise de 2008, o relatório La Rosière, de 25 de fevereiro de 2009, relativo à supervisão financeira na Europa nos anos que antecederam a crise de 2008, evidencia os altíssimos valores dos esquemas em que se viram envolvidas as entidades financeiras europeias (Disponível em http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf)

[3] Sublinhando esta situação, no domínio da educação, com repercussões negativas numa verdadeira educação para a cidadania, cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Sem fins lucrativos , Ediçoes 70, Lisboa, 2019, p. 35 e ss.

Simultaneously, a public discourse of delegitimization emerged, with some force, about the institutions that intended to do their job of regulation and control and, specifically, the Courts or the Public Prosecutor's Office.

The Italian example is paradigmatic[5]. Systematically, the Courts were called, at the very least, "blocking" forces when, in the exercise of their functions, they controlled the application of laws in the financial, administrative or even, as an ultima ratio, in the criminal field. Italy was just the beginning. Spain, Argentina, Brazil, are examples of mirror situations that occurred in other parts of the globe.

It was, in all these situations, a discourse that saw (and sees) in the law and the law, and those who enforce them, obstacles to laisser faire, laisser passer, which, although diverse from country to country or from conjuncture to conjuncture, systematically emerged (and continues to emerge) in certain social and political areas. A discourse that is sustained by the affirmation of social regulation or minimum control and that almost always sees formal institutions of control as an obstacle to development, understood as something that depends only and solely on individual, personal or collective initiative, territorially circumscribed and without concern for global sustainability.

THE "2008-2011 BOOM

The crisis triggered in 2008, with a follow-up in 2011-2012, was the "explosion" of the "egg" that hit everything and everyone.

What was a symptom has become reality. The financial collapse that occurred had consequences in the economy, in politics and especially in the social fabric of many countries with economies that were not very solidified or very dependent or exposed to others. Countries in Europe, such as Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain and even Italy, or in other latitudes, such as Brazil, are examples, although differentiated, of all those situations. The shrapnel never stopped making itself felt. The "years of lead", in the very appropriate expression of Eduardo Paz Ferreira[6].

The very serious financial, economic, and social repercussions that have directly affected citizens have accelerated the fissures in the social fabric, causing multiple new conflicts to emerge.

A political and financial discourse based on very strong budgetary restrictions, even if balanced with cyclical improvements, legitimized the reduction of income for those who work, the application of maximal austerity measures and above all the reduction or even elimination or reduction of social rights. The resulting real impoverishment of the majority of the population (even though a minority continues to be increasingly wealthy), the increase in unemployment or labor precariousness are just a few examples of what has occurred (and continues to occur) in many countries around the world, on several continents.

"THE AGE OF REGRESSION"

With a few people responsible for the "crash" removed, and a few "heads" replaced, the holders of economic and financial power and their interpreters in government quickly regained

[4] Assim, Elio lo Monte, «Politicheneo-liberaliste e questione criminal ne la post-modernitá», Revista TrimestralediDirittoPenaledell'economia, anno XXIII, n.º 4 ottobre-dicembre, 2010, pp. 727.

[5] Sobre a situação italiana é absolutamente impressivo o «retrato» efetuado por Luigi Ferrajoli em Poderes Selvages.La crisis de la democracia constitucional, MinimaTrotta, Madrid, 2011, esp. pp.52-64.

[6] Paz Ferreira, Crónicas dosAnos de Chumbo, Edições 70, Lisboa, 2013

their role in the dialogue with governments and, specifically, the "de facto" exercise of conducting and conditioning public policy.

Some of the actors who, in fact, continue to drive the "new policies" of governance today, have merely resumed places of responsibility that they held before the 2008 crisis.

Those who have been criminally indicted for having criminal responsibilities in the triggering of the crisis, because they are involved in extremely high value economic crimes, see their cases blocked or never come to an end, due to their own financial capacity to use and circumvent the legal system. One could resume, in this regard, the affirmation, in practice, of a "friend's criminal law", which allows such manipulation[7].

Paradoxically, it continues to be observed na increase of the inequalities, in particular the gap between rich and poor countries, and a no decrease in corruption phenomena. The data is unequivocal: in 2017, "in all OECD countries, people with low incomes report a higher level of unmet need for medical care than people with higher incomes. Similarly, says the study, "socioeconomically disadvantaged students are almost three times more likely than better-off students not to reach the benchmark level of science skills.[8]

Otherwise, the manifest complicities between public and private interests are evident, and the little effectiveness in damage control policies is evident.

The result is a dramatic decrease in trust in public institutions as control mechanisms. The 2017 report cited from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)[9] is very clear in this regard: "trust in public institutions is reduced, and the perception that governments' policies favor interest groups, has risen sharply." In this area, there is a kind of path to "zero-degree" public trust in institutions.

On the other hand, populist governance phenomena emerge, doctrinally and substantially unstructured, but with appearances of great attractiveness, public policies restricting fundamental rights or exacerbating transnational social problems, namely those resulting from disordered migrations.

This is still the general picture of the effects of the crisis. We speak, therefore, of the "age of regression "[10]. As if we were living in a kind of civilizational "backward step" or in a time of "regressive modernization".

It is clear today that the idea of a self-regulated society is a self-destructive utopia, "incompatible with social and human life".[11]

For this reason, the various powers of control are required to play an essential role in its affirmation and consolidation, even if executed from different perspectives and levels and by differentiated actors. We can thus speak of social control, constitutional control, administrative control, financial control, and criminal control.

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[7] Expressão utilizada por Luigi Foffani, in «Escândalos económicos y reformas penales: Prevencion y represión de las infracciones societarias en la era de la globalization», Revista Penal, n.º 23, Enero 2009, p. 37, a propósito de situações concretas que envolveram a aplicação do direito penal do mercado de valores mobiliários em Itália.

[8] OCDE, Panorama das Administrações Públicas, 2017 (GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2017 – ISBN 978-92-64-268739 © OECD 2017.

[9] OCDE, Government at a Glance 2017, citado.

[10] A expressão consta, em várias intervenções, na obra coletiva, L'Âge de la Regression, PremierParallelle, Paris, 2017, onde vários autores analisam, sobre várias perspetivas a situação atual decorrente das crises.

[11] Cesar Rendueles,«De la regressionglobaleauxcontremouvementspostcapitaliste», in AA.VV, L'Âge de la Regression, cit., p. 262.

SOCIAL CONTROL

There is today a different and greater scrutiny of the possibility of public control of many phenomena in the exercise of public service, including its pathological dimension. Social networks and their effects are no longer just science fiction. What occasionally happens is exponentiated to the world, with a set of consequences.

On the other hand, the relevance of social movements, diversified according to interests that are also diverse in each country, constitutes a mechanism of effective control of some policies that restrict rights. Their role, in recent years, in countries such as Spain, Greece, Italy or Brazil, has been unequivocal as a mechanism of effective social control. Very recently, symptoms of this social control have begun to emerge in societies that are traditionally less open and subject to greater controls by public and governmental institutions, as is the case of Hong Kong or even Russia.

This social control is based on greater transparency, on a wide exchange of information, and implies greater and better knowledge, which entails enhanced accountability requirements for those who exercise public functions. It is, however, a control that involves risks, namely through the manipulation or unverifiability of facts and opinions exposed, as well as an uncontrolled expansion, often without the possibility of being effectively contradicted.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL

In a first dimension of institutional control, functioning as the top of the "pyramid", is the control of constitutionality of laws.

Public governance and its concrete policies are always subject to the laws and the Constitution. Knowledge of the constitutional limits that naturally have to shape the policies developed by public authorities is the first step in the democratic legitimacy of governance.

Even in less consensual moments, when the policies to be adopted can make the limits of the constitutional compatibility of the laws that enshrine them, good governance should know that it is subject to the test of the review of the constitutionality of the rules. And, therefore, it should not fear it.

In a Rule of Law, it is at times of crisis that the appeal to national courts to enforce citizens' rights, namely by demanding compliance with the Constitution, perhaps has its crucial moment.

The application of the Constitution has, in these moments, its test of relevance.

In this sense, because it is up to the Courts to apply the norms in accordance with the Constitution, the judiciary is, in moments of crisis, a fundamental support for the aggregation of the values and principles that sustain the Rule of Law.

As known, constitutional courts function as watchdog, gate - keeper, or guardians of the Constitution.

On the other hand, it is the Constitution's job to impose its legal force, even in times of crisis, by concretely serving as a legal brake on public policies that conflict with the norms and principles established by the constituent legislator.

"The Constitution must always impose its force, even - and above all - in times of crisis",[12] Tiago Antunes rightly points out.

Paradoxically, or perhaps not, constitutional problems are also posed, in an almost linked way, "outside" the state in two dimensions. In a first line of understanding, a transnational process is identified that encompasses various geographical and political realities. In a second dimension, but

[12] "Reflexões constitucionais em tempo de crise económica-financeira", in O Direito, Ano 143º, V, 2011. p. 1.098.

at the same time, a relocation of the problems outside the institutionalized political sector, namely to the private sectors of world society, becomes evident.

As a consequence, many problems, even if placed on a national constitutional level, cannot fail to be thought of, legally, from a transnational perspective.

As Konrad Hesse said in May 1999, "the world of the sovereign National State (...) has entered its sunset. History has continued its march away from the grounds on which it took root, which until now has served as the secure substratum of State and Constitutional theory".[13]

The point is that constitutional law has emancipated itself from a state dimension and cannot be seen today, outside a framework of global protection of citizens, beyond a specific territorial dimension. Namely in a perspective of protection of fundamental rights, human rights and also social rights, which cannot be "barred" at the borders of national sovereignty. Therefore, today we speak of a transnational dialogue between the various courts, namely between constitutional courts and international courts, within the scope of human rights jurisdiction[14].

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

From the point of view of the control of administrative legality, the expansion, and in some cases the paradigm shift, of administrative law, stemming from a formalistic view of what administrative control was, has brought about significant changes in this field.

In the Portuguese case, following other European experiences, this change brought about two significant perspectives. On the one hand, the active legitimacy of administrative control has been extended to citizens, namely through collective action, when diffuse interests are at stake. Issues such as environmental protection, the right to health, the right to public safety, among others, now allow for judicial validation by citizens' initiative.

On the other hand and in a second dimension, the very scope of jurisdictional intervention regarding the control of legality of administrative acts has been expanded, particularly with regard to the amplification of injunctive relief, underlying the activity and implementation of certain administrative acts[15].

This expansion carries risks. On the one hand, in the context of the delimitation of boundaries with direct consequences for the restrictions on public policies, namely the degree of autonomy of the legislative power itself in the realization of public policies. On the other, because of what some authors consider to be the "excessive and abusive use of precautionary measures "[16] and a consequent possibility of "stopping" public action and intervention.

FINANCIAL CONTROL

[13] Apud Ignacio GutiérrezGutiérrez, «Derecho Constitucional para la Sociedad Multicultural» in Derecho Constitucional para la sociedade multicultural, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2007, p. 9.

[14] Como exemplo de diálogo entre o Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos os vários tribunais nacionais mas também para o Tribunal Constitucional, cf. Sousa Ribeiro, «Encontros e desencontros ente a jurisprudência do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos e a jurisprudência nacional», Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência, Ano 148º n.º 4014, 2019, p. 142 e 162.

[15] Sobre este ponto, cf. Ana Gouveia Martins, «Efectividade da tutela cautelar», in Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa, n.º 124, Julho/Agosto de 2017, p. 3 e Marco Caldeira, «A efetividade da tutela cautelar: algumas notas sobre o regime da execução das decisões cautelares administrativas», Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa, n.º 124. Julho/Agosto, 2017, p. 72.

[16] Assim, Tiago Duarte, «Providências cautelares, suspensões automáticas e resoluções fundamentadas: pios a emenda que o soneto», JULGAR, nº 26, Maio/Agosto, 2015, p. 78.

In another dimension, we can identify financial control, although sub-divided into the public finance aspect and the economy-related aspect.

The importance of finance in the organizational schemes of States goes beyond the strict and merely pecuniary dimension of traditional financial discourse. Finances are the "financial nerve of the Republic", in Canotilho's expression[17].

The requirement for good governance of public money, through effective budgetary controls, is now an essential reality.

The social awareness of the public dimension of available financial resources, which are always reduced, namely because their source is essentially derived from citizens' and companies' income, even if through indirect taxation, brings about a new demand for the way in which they are applied. Today, its efficient and effective management assumes an effective content. It is not only a question of controlling legality, but also of the dimensions of economy, efficiency and effectiveness of political options with economic repercussions. It goes beyond the mere formal control of strict legality, questioning not the choices, but their economic sustainability and consequences. Principles such as intergenerational equity, or the economic sustainability of policy options are today called upon to configure financial legality criteria.

In this latter sense, future generations cannot be mortgaged by unsupported choices and options based on justifications of very short-term interests.

It is in this context that the control carried out by the Courts of Auditors is absolutely relevant in the good management of public money.

The Courts of Auditors are fundamental external control institutions in the control system of public funds.

The jurisdictional competencies assigned to enforce financial responsibility arising from misuse of public money are distributed among different entities and jurisdictions in the various countries.

In France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Brazil and many Latin American countries, although with differentiated legal frameworks, it is the responsibility of the Courts of Auditors, in certain areas, to enforce the financial responsibility arising from misuse of public money. Always, of course, with the safeguard of the criminal competencies that the same matters may entail and that, in this case, are attributed to the Public Prosecutor's Office and, as a rule, to the common courts.

The Auditing Jurisdiction, as an exclusive and special jurisdiction for assessing and judging financial responsibility, exists precisely to effectively resolve, without the inconveniences of the invasive and ultima ratio nature of criminal law, and in adjective terms of criminal procedure[18], the pathologies that affect the management and use of public money. Which is not to say that financial responsibility does not have to have a guaranteeing dimension underpinned by pre-defined rules, both as to the typicality and scope of the offense and even from a procedural point of view. Which does not have to be superimposed on the criminal system. It is worth mentioning the important decision of the European Court of Human Rights (Rigolio v. Italy, 14.5.2014)[19] on this differentiation and its repercussion on the legal framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, in which it was considered that there was no violation of Article 7 of the Convention in a case in which the procedure before the Italian Court of Auditors, in which an

[17] J.J. Gomes Canotilho, «Incomensurabilidade dos discursos ou hierarquias entrelaçadas nos sistemas jurídicos multinível», Católica LawReview, Janeiro 2017, Volume 1, n.º 1, p 39.

[18] Claramente neste sentido, cf. Pelino Santoro, L'IllecitoContabile e La responsabilità amministrativa, Maggioli Editores, 2011, p.78.

[19] Desenvolvidamente, José Mouraz Lopes, «O processo de responsabilidade financeira diante do Tribunal de Contas, à luz da Convenção Europeia dos Direitos Humanos», in AAVV, Comentário à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos Humanos,Universidade Católica, Lisboa, 2019 (no prelo).

amount of money was charged to the applicant in a financial matter, and the fact that it was not of a criminal nature, did not imply the application and consequent violation of the aforementioned article.

With regard to financial regulation, authors like Teubner, taking into account the existence of global financial markets, advocate a monetary reform that ultimately "requires global constitutional solutions" based on "cooperation among central banks "[20].

From an economic point of view, the principles that conform the defense of property, contract, and competition, as institutes that represent the founding pillars of economic constitutions, must be legally safeguarded in order to avoid distortions or appropriations by deregulated markets.

Economics and finance, even if sustained by their own principles, need more control from the law, never a reduction of the law.

Legality controls, both through financial regulatory institutions and central Banks, are today essential mechanisms for controlling the financial dimension of the state, which, as we know, has repercussions across the entire spectrum of governance. They are, therefore, an essential dimension of the Rule of Law.

THE CRIMINAL CONTROL

In a last dimension, it is important to pay attention to criminal policy as an essential mechanism of control, namely in the prevention and repression of criminal pathologies that concretely affect the dimension of the State and its governance.

We emphasize, in particular, the responses required to the consequences of the pathologies of governance resulting from corruption, even if seen in a broad sense.

The broad concept of corruption includes "any abuse of power for one's own benefit "[21]in the sense given by the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament[22].

Such a concept does not reduce the requirement to deal, in substantive terms, with the legally relevant criminal matrix, which may include various criminal types that cover, among others, corruption stricto sensu, influence peddling, economic participation in business, concussion, abuse of power, money laundering, and even crimes involving other legal goods, such as corruption in sport or tax crime.

The use of such an elastic concept allows for greater operability of the anti-corruption public policies, in its preventive and repressive dimensions, not necessarily criminal, carried out by the various institutions that, in this scope, intervene according to their competencies.

We could summarize, within this scope, the need for more effective reinforcement or enforcement, in order to, on the one hand, prevent its dissemination (prevention), and, on the other hand, reinforce and make more effective the system of repression.

First and foremost, its compatibility with the strengthening of the competencies of the administration's internal oversight bodies, both through their greater autonomy and independence and through the reinforcement of their powers and means of action.

[20] GuntherTeubner, Nuoviconfliticostituzionali, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2012, p. 107

[21] Aprofundadamente, José Mouraz Lopes, O Espectro da Corrupção, Almedina, Coimbra, 2011.

[22] Cf. o primeiro RELATÓRIO DA COMISSÃO AO CONSELHO E AO PARLAMENTO EUROPEU RELATÓRIO ANTICORRUPÇÃO DA EU, Bruxelas, 2014, in c.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_pt.pdf.

Also, the interconnection between all the entities that cross paths in the inspection and monitoring process, allowing information to be cross-referenced and shared. The enforcement of the supervisory and regulatory entities is, therefore, of unquestionable relevance.

With regard to sanctioning the pathologies of financial systems, we should think about control and reaction systems that are also exceptional, particularly in terms of immediate response, where procedural mechanisms, without jeopardizing fundamental rights, must be much more efficient and effective. Therefore, procedures similar to immediate injunctions, blockages and sanctions based on evidentiary systems, which are also exceptional, are some of the solutions that can be found. Situations that, however, do not need to go exclusively through criminal law.

With regard to conflicts of interest and specifically the revolving door, the weak mechanisms of control over situations involving this type of permeability must be overcome, namely the institutional weakness of the entities that regulate and supervise matters relating to incompatibilities of public office, as well as some of the social tolerance they involve.

Finally, there are also diversified risk areas that require diversified treatment. Areas such as public contracting, due to the values and risks they involve, should be subject to mechanisms that prevent all deviations from legality and allow for the consequent alert that should be given to the authorities. We are here in the realm of so-called "whistleblowing", which are in-depth alert mechanisms with enormous practical relevance.

Still within the scope of controlling the functioning of the criminal investigation system, it is possible to create fast, effective and even more economically sustained responses in the field of techniques and methods for investigating crimes and even for their trial, namely in the scope of all the complex criminality that is usually involved in corruption.

In the scope of criminal investigation management, in this matter, the assertiveness of the investigation management is particularly relevant, by identifying its object, restricting its effective capacity of evidence, which is not very compatible with "mega-processes", whose management difficulty is evident. An investigation is only effective if it is limited to the subject matter of the case, which cannot be constantly expanded to the flavor of sparse information that arises during the investigation and that, without an immediate triage, makes the investigation ungovernable.

Likewise, the option for "surgical" and faster investigations, using the "separation of cases" mechanism as a useful management tool, does not seem to conflict with the principle of legality that should guide all actions of the Public Prosecutor's Office, as long as all inherent defense guarantees are ensured.

CONCLUSION

Democracy is not only a system of government. In Tawneya's words, democracy must also be "a type of society and a way of life in harmony with that social model.[23]

The democratic model, as far as the exercise of public management is concerned, requires broad controls by the various State institutions, allowing for its transnational dimension, the public and private systems, and above all that it takes into account the public demands for transparency owed to the citizens.

As some studies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[24] point out, "strengthening the integrity of government institutions and elected representatives, establishing an ongoing dialogue with citizens through open and participatory policymaking

[23] Richard Tawney, Equality, New York, Harper, 1931.

[24] Cf, OCDE, Panorama das Administrações Públicas, 2017 (GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2017 - ISBN 978-92-64-268739 © OECD 2017)

methods, and strengthening the government's ability to choose the most appropriate policies from a range of options are all essential to bring governments back closer to their citizens and to foster more inclusive and sustainable growth.

Citizens who just want to see good government delivered by those they voted for.